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Abstract 
The legal environment, the structure of the financial system as well as the concentration of 
corporate ownership and the development of the capital market suggest for Austria a high 
effectiveness of the monetary policy with a strong impact of the lending channel. This 
supposition was verified combining three supplementary empirical methods: Granger 
causality between the velocities of money and loans and the real output; impulse-response 
functions for VECs with the subsequently opened/closed money/credit channels; the 
predictive power of money and loan variables for a production forecast. Both various types of 
loans and the total volume of credits for separate banking groups were examined. The 
Austrian output showed to be highly sensitive to monetary policy innovations; both the 
money and the credit channel were significant. The dependence of Austrian firms on credits 
rather than on other financial resources was more pronounced for credits in domestic 
currency, mortgage loans and municipal notes. 
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1. Introduction and literature overview 
Modern macroeconomics considers several mechanisms by which monetary factors and the 
monetary policy can be transmitted into the real economy. In a closed economy with sticky 
prices or nominal wages, changes in money supply influence the real aggregate demand 
and output through the interest rates channel. This traditional Keynesian model, advocated 
by some researches (for example, Taylor 1995) to be a key component of the monetary 
transmission, is, however, criticised by other economists. In an open economy the transmis-
sion of the monetary policy operates through the exchange rate channel on net export: 
when nominal wages or prices are sticky, the exchange rate effect induces the substitution 
between foreign and domestic goods and subsequently influences aggregate demand and 
supply. In his overview for a symposium on “The Monetary Transmission Mechanism” 
Mishkin (1995) provides the following schematic diagrams for the interest rate effect: 
M i I Y¯ Þ ­ Þ ¯ Þ ¯  and for the exchange rate effect: M i E NX Y¯ Þ ­ Þ ­ Þ ¯ Þ ¯ ; 
where – as far as the interest rate channel is concerned – the contraction of the monetary 
aggregate M ¯  leads to a rise in real interest rates i ­ , which in turn raises the cost of 
capital, causing thereby a decline in investment spending I ¯ , which leads to a decline in 
aggregate demand and a fall in output Y ¯ ; whereas – as far as the exchange rate channel 
is concerned –  the contraction of money M ¯  raises the real interest rate, thus making 
domestic deposits more attractive than deposits denominated in foreign currencies, thereby 
appreciating the domestic currency rate E ­ . The higher value of the domestic currency 
makes domestic goods more expensive and thus causes a fall in net export NX ¯ and 
consequently in aggregate output.   
However, traditional interest rate and exchange rate mechanisms have become a subject of 
criticism nowadays and many recent publications promote credit markets as a key compo-
nent in the transmission of the monetary policy to the real economy (credit channel mecha-
nism ). In the traditional money view only two classes of assets are considered, namely 
money and all other assets. The crucial argument of the credit view is the distinct role played 
by financial assets and liabilities. Firstly, internal funds, bank loans and other sources of 
financing are imperfect substitutes for firms. Secondly, a heterogeneous structure of 
borrowers leads to different reactions among them to changes in credit conditions. Thirdly, a 
wedge between external and internal financing can occur due to imperfect information or 
costly enforcement of contracts. And finally, the growth of interest rates influences firms with 
weaker balance sheets stronger. Two basic mechanisms are proposed for the explanation of 
the monetary policy transmission taking into account the heterogeneities in a credit market: 
the bank lending channel and a broader financial-accelerator mechanism . The bank 
lending channel assumes, that bank credits remain to be the dominant source of financing 
for small and medium-sized firms, whereas large firms can directly access the credit market 
issuing corporate securities like stocks and bonds. The schematic diagram for the bank lend-
ing channel by Mishkin (1995) states: M bank deposits bank loans I Y¯ Þ ¯ Þ ¯ Þ ¯ Þ ¯_ _ . 
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The contraction in money supply decreases the volume of bank deposits, which can not be 
easily replaced by banks with other sources of funds, therefore some borrowers would be cut 
off from credits, thus increasing the external finance premium and reducing the real activity.  
The broader view of the credit channel mechanism is not only restricted to the bank lending 
channel. The heterogeneity of the financial positions of borrowers leads to different external 
finance premiums among them, and the quality of these borrowers’ balance sheets influ-
ences the structure of financing. This balance sheet channel is often referred to as the 
financial accelerator mechanism  since the movements in the borrowers’ balance sheets 
can magnify business cycles. Mishkin (1995) suggests three diagrams, demonstrating 
different ways of the transmission of the monetary policy through the balance sheet channel.  
M net worth adverse selection moral hazard lending I Y¯ Þ ¯ Þ ­ µ ­ Þ ¯ Þ ¯ Þ ¯_ _ _  
M i cash flow adverse selection moral hazard lending I Y¯ Þ ­ Þ ¯ Þ ­ µ ­ Þ ¯ Þ ¯ Þ ¯_ _ _  
M fin assets likelihood of fin distress expenditure Y¯ Þ ¯ Þ ­ Þ ¯ Þ ¯_ _ _ _  
Tight monetary policy weakens the borrowers’ balance sheets in several ways: it weakens 
the financial position of a firm (by diminishing the value of the borrower’s collateral and the 
value of the firm’s net worth); it decreases net cash flows; and a rise in interest rates 
increases interest expenses (supposing that a firm has floating-rate or short-term debts). The 
adverse selection problem arises, when the drop in the net worth causes higher losses by 
adverse selection for lenders – this shrinks lending. The drop in the net worth of firms also 
makes owners more incentive to engage themselves in risky investment projects, which is 
referred to as being a moral hazard problem.  
Cecchetti (1999) considers the impact of both the legal and the financial structure of a 
country on its conduction of monetary policy and introduces an index of the effectiveness of 
the monetary policy for four classes of legal environments (English common law, 
Scandinavian common law, French civil law and German civil law). The index shows higher 
values for countries that belong to the German “legal family”, denoting the higher impact of 
interest rate changes on the real output. The difference between the relative importance of 
the money and the credit channel of the monetary policy transmission might depend on the 
following factors: that a better legal protection for shareholders and debtors implies a lower 
impact of the lending channel; that countries, in which the banking system is less healthier 
and less concentrated, have restricted possibilities for banks to preserve their balance 
sheets values while the policy changes, what imposes the domination of the lending channel; 
that countries, whose individual firms are more dependent on bank loans and have a limited 
direct access to the capital markets imply the stronger credit channel of the policy 
transmission. The Austrian bank system, on the one hand, has a very high ratio of number of 
banks per capita (namely 126 per million people) and is, on the other hand, composed of a 
network of relatively small banks. The health of the Austrian banking system measured by 
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the return on assets, the loan loss provisions, the net interest margin and operating costs, 
was ranked into the second from four possible clusters. The underdevelopment of the 
Austrian capital market, the low number of publicly listed firms and the high ratio of bank 
loans in the total sources of financing put Austria among the countries with a high 
effectiveness of the monetary policy with a strong impact of the credit channel. 
The purpose of the present paper is to examine empirically the above-mentioned 
assumption, paying attention to the possible heterogeneous bank-structure. The outline of 
the paper is as follows. Section 2 considers the discrimination between the money and the 
credit channel from different points of view: section 2.1 presents the macroeconomic 
framework for the monetary policy transmission, the theoretical model treats the interactions 
between a National Bank, commercial banks and private firms; section 2.2 covers the 
diagnostic tools to be used in empirical studies. The description of the dataset and a 
preliminary testing of it (unit root test and multivariate and bivariate cointegration analysis) 
are given in section 3. Section 4 demonstrates the results of empirical studies: section 4.1 
introduces the definitions of the money and the loan velocity as error-correction terms, 
characterizing the deviations from common stochastic trends; section 4.2 examines the 
Granger causality between the money (or loan) velocity and the real sector output 
(measured in the form of industrial production index); section 4.3 investigates the impulse-
response functions for the models that contain different measures of bank loans and money 
aggregates; section 4.4 analyses the relative predictive power of the money and the loan 
variable for the out-of-sample forecast of the real sector output. Finally, section 5 evaluates 
the results of the previous section and concludes the paper.  
2. Discrimination between the money and the credit 
channel  
2.1 Macroeconomic framework 
The following briefly sketched macroeconomic model was introduced by Ramey (1993) as a 
framework for the analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism. The model originates 
from an extended IS_LM model and specifies the interactions between firms, banks and a 
National Bank. The rest of the economy is not formulated: the optimisation problem of the 
household sector and the market clearing conditions are not stipulated.   
The production function for goods of a representative firm: 
 Y f K N
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P
L
Pt t yt
t ft
t
t t
t
t=
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q h
l         (1) 
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connects output Yt  with input, which combines capital K t , labour N yt , real money balances 
M
P
ft
t
 and real bank loans 
L
P
t
t
; l q,  and hstand for shocks in technology, the productivity of 
money and the productivity of bank loans. The balance sheet identity of a firm is given by 
M L Bf = + , assuming money Mf, bank loans L and corporate bonds B to be the firm’s only 
assets and liabilities. The credit channel mechanism implies, that bank loans and corporate 
bonds are not perfect substitutes, therefore L  enters the production function as a separate 
argument. The current real profit for a firm is given by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )F Y i M
P
i
L
P
N i Kft t mt t
ft
t
lt t
t
t
t ft t t t= - + - - - - -r r v p  ,   (2) 
where rm  denotes the fee for bank transactions, i  is the nominal interest rate on bonds, rl  
is the interest rate for bank loans, v  is the real wage rate, p  is the inflation rate, 
correspondently the rental price of capital ( )i - p  is equal to the real interest rate. Equation 
(2) does not contain bonds directly, they are eliminated via substitution from the balance 
sheet identity. The firm maximises the current profit Fft  in (2), given the production function 
in (1). The supply function of goods takes the form:   
 Y y i i it
s
mt t lt t t t t t t t= + - -
é
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ê
ù
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ú
- - - + + +
( ), ( ), , ( ), ,
?
r r v p l q h  ,    (3) 
where the sign under the argument indicates the sign of the derivative with respect to the 
argument. Here the presence of the credit channel mechanism implies, that the elasticity of 
the output with respect to ( )rl i- is negative and significant. The rise in the interest rate for 
bank loans rl  will make credits more expensive for a firm. Since bank loans and other 
financial resources are imperfect substitutes for a firm, some borrowers will be cut off from 
this funds and therefore the aggregate production will decline. The ambiguous effect can 
occur, when large firms are indifferent to the sources of financing or are able to borrow 
abroad: confronted with the increase in the domestic credit rate, borrowers will switch to 
other financial resources or to cheaper foreign credits, therefore an increase in the loans’ 
rate has no or even a positive influence on the real sector output.  
The representative bank’s balance sheet identity M R L Bb= + +  supposes, that the only 
liability are transaction deposits and that the only assets are reserves R , loans L  and 
corporate bonds. The current real profit of a representative bank is:  
 ( ) ( )F i M
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P
i
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R M
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I H S — Krylova / The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy — 5 
Bank revenues consist of: earnings rm  from transaction services M , earnings rl  from bank 
loans L  and earnings of the nominal interest rate i  from the holdings of corporate bonds. A 
bank’s cost function b  depends on real wages v  (as far as banks use labour force to 
produce transactions and credit services), resources in the form of deposits and loans, 
excess reserves 
R M
P
- t
 (where t  is the reserve requirement on money) and the economy 
technology shock l  that also affects bank services’ production. A bank’s profit maximization 
will lead to the following supply functions for transaction and credit services:  
 ( ) ( )M
P
m i i
R
P
t
t
s
t mt lt t t
t
t t
= + -
é
ë
ê
ê
ù
û
ú
ú+ - + +
r r v l, , , ,
?
     (5) 
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, , , ,       (6) 
The supply of each item depends positively on its price, the level of real reserves and the 
technology shock and is negatively related to the real wage. The presence of the credit 
channel assumes that banks transmit changes in the monetary policy into the real economy, 
therefore the elasticity of loan supply with respect to reserves in (6) must be high. 
The Federal Reserve  (or National Bank) sets the level of reserves according to the 
following reaction function, which supposes, that the supply of real reserves depends on the 
current state of the economy and  a monetary shock:  
 [ ]R
P
k Y it
t
t t t t= , ,p m         (7) 
Equilibrium quantities are the functions of shocks (such as a technology shock l , a 
money demand shock q , a loan demand shock h and a monetary policy shock m) and the 
set S of any relevant state variables. The expression for the equilibrium output will be:  
 ( ) ( )[ ]Y j M S L K St t t t t t t t t t t= m l q m l h l, , , , , , , , , ,     (8) 
where M(.) is the equilibrium money balance and L(.) is the equilibrium loan balance. The 
influence of a monetary policy shock on the real economy can be considered an elasticity 
with respect to m:  
 
¶
¶m
¶
¶
¶
¶m
¶
¶
¶
¶m
Y j
M
M j
L
L
= +         (9) 
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If credit markets do not play a significant role in the transmission of the monetary policy, then 
only the first argument in (9) is important, whereas the presence of the credit channel 
mechanism alone implies that only the second term is significant. The relative importance of 
the money versus the credit channel is contained in the relative magnitude of both terms.  
Different ways to transfer the monetary policy to the real economy can also be schematically 
represented by Figure 1. If the transmission mechanism consists of the money channel 
alone, then only the paths a1 and a2 operate, showing the influence of financial institutions on 
the money market, which in his turn influences the real economy, and path a3 shows a 
reverse reaction of the real economy on the money market. In this case the value of the first 
term in equation (9) will highly dominate in forming the total value of the elasticity of the real 
economy with respect to monetary policy shocks. In case the conduction of monetary policy 
occurs through the credit channel alone, only the paths b1 and b2 function, demonstrating the 
impact of financial institutions on the credit market, which in his turn affects the real 
economy, and path b3 accounts for a reverse response. Correspondently, in equation (9) only 
the value of the second term is significant. The relative magnitude of both terms in (9) 
determines, which of the two channels has a stronger impact on the transmission 
mechanism. Analogously, the comparison of the portions of shock that travel each of the 
ways a or b in Figure 1 is responsible of a relative extent of the money (credit) channel.  
2.2 Methodology of empirical studies 
Empirical studies on the relative importance of monetary policy channels meet essential 
restrictions in methodology, since some of the traditional methods could end in misleading 
results. Standard Granger-causality tests, which measure the significance of the coefficients 
in vector autoregressions (VAR), might be inadequate. For example, if a technology shock 
l reaches money or bank loans before it changes the output, then a reverse reaction a3 or 
b3 in Figure 1 appears before the real economy changes. In this case the lagged values of 
the money (or loan) variable will have significant coefficients in VAR and the causality 
between money (or loans) and the real activity is considered. Here, the predictive power of 
the money (or loans) variable is not due to the money (or credit) channel of the monetary 
policy transmission, but due to a delayed reaction of the real output on technology shocks 
(compared to the quick response of the money (or loans) aggregate to the shock). The direct 
use of impulse-response functions for VARs will also suffer from the above-mentioned issue. 
A shock in the money (or loan) variable cannot always be straightly attributed to the 
monetary transmission mechanism, therefore it is not sufficient to consider an impulse-
response of the real economy to a money (or loan) shock. 
We will use the following methodology, incorporating different issues of empirical studies on 
the relative importance of the channels for the conduction of the monetary policy into the real 
economy. According to modern tendencies in econometrics (Ramey (1993); Konishi, Ramey 
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and Granger (1992)), we use velocity type variables, which capture short-run movements 
of financial variables in a very efficient way. Many implications of macroeconomic theory 
illustrate, that – considering for example technology shocks – output, consumption, 
investment and monetary aggregates are nonstationary – this supposition coincides with 
empirical investigations. If we assume a technology shock to be the only source of 
nonstationarity, then all variables in the model should share the same stochastic trend; 
however, empirical studies affirm this hypothesis only in some cases. Among several 
reasons for this disparity are incompleteness of a model, presence of other shocks in a 
model, nonstationarity of the nominal interest rates, etc. Vector Error Correction (VEC) 
models permit us to scrutinize the behaviour of velocity type variables. In the following VAR 
representation the vector Z consists of investigated variables: 
   Z A Zt i t i
i
k
t= + å +-
=
h e
1
 , 
where h is a ( )n + 1   vector of deterministic variables, Ai, i=1..k  is a ( ) ( )n n+ ´ +1 1 coefficient 
matrix and e is a ( )n + 1  vector of white noise errors with zero mean and constant variance. 
The model can be reformulated in the error-correction form: 
  D G D PZ Z zt i t i
i
k
t t= + å + +-
=
-
-h e
1
1
1     
where Gi j
j i
k
A= - å
= +1
, i=1..k-1 is a coefficient matrix; P = å -
=
A Ij
j
k
1
 is a ( ) ( )n n+ ´ +1 1  matrix 
with the rank equal to the number of cointegrating vectors. The full rank of P corresponds to 
the stationarity of all the series, the zero rank implies the absence of any common stochastic 
trend. The number of cointegrating vectors and the specification of common stochastic 
trends is a crucial point in the investigation of the monetary transmission mechanism using 
velocity type variables for money and loans. The importance of a particular channel of the 
monetary transmission mechanism implies that the velocity of the money (or credit) 
aggregate Granger causes the output movement. We test Granger causality for the 
changes (first differences) in the industrial production using the Wald test for the joint 
significance of the regression coefficients. To verify the results of Granger causality studies, 
which measure the information content of an explanatory variable corresponding to the 
future movement of an endogenous variable, additional tests are performed. At first, we 
investigate impulse -response functions, which transmit the standard deviation of 
innovation in one variable to other endogenous variables in VEC. The reference impulse-
response function of the industrial production to innovation in the National Bank rate (which 
accesses firstly money and loan markets and only then travels to the real economy) was 
compared with the impulse-response functions, which close the money (or credit) channel. 
The impulse-response function using the particular channel closed, that exhibits more 
differences from the reference function, is responsible for the preponderant channel of the 
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monetary policy transmission. Secondly, we investigate the predictive power of money and 
loan variables for the out-of-sample forecast of the industrial production. 
3. Data description and preliminary testing 
3.1 Data description 
We use the monthly data from KGEN and IFS databases (maintained by WIFO) and the 
internal IHS-prognose database, the sample period covers 1983:12 – 2000:9 (see Table 1 for 
the description of the dataset). The variables employed are industrial production (IP) as a 
measure of the real economy output, consumer price index (CPI) as an inflation measure; 
money supply aggregates were calculated from the available data series of deposits and 
cash using the following formulas:  
M1= Banknotes in circulation -  Coins in circulation + Sight deposits; 
M2 = M1 + Time deposits ;  M3 = M2 + Saving deposits . 
The interest rates, which were used in the model, contain the following components: the 
Austrian National Bank interest rate /Referenzzinsatz der Oesterreichischen Nationalbank / 
IRefer (as an analogy to the Federal Fund rate); short-term interest rates: the 3-months 
interest rate of the German National Bank /Zinssatz für 3-Monatsgelder der Deutschen 
Bundesbank / I3m and the Austrian overnight rate /AUT Zinssatz für täglich fällige Gelder/ 
rdkb; the Austrian deposit rate IDep; the secondary market rate /Sekundärmarktrendite/ rs and 
a long-term interest rate in the form of the ten-year German bond interest rate I10y. The rates 
RDKB and RS were taken from the IHS-prognose database and the I10y from the IHS term-
structure forecast database (this series was estimated on the basis of real bond prices). The 
data for bank loans were taken in the forms of: bank-drafts to domestic non-banking firms 
/Wechselkredite an inländische Nichtbanken/ CrW; mortgage loans and municipal notes 
/Hypothekar -, Kommunaldarlehen/ CrHK; the total volume of credits in domestic currency 
/Schilling-Kredite an inländische Nichtbanken/ CrATS and the total volume of credits in foreign 
currencies /Fremdwährungskredite/ Cr$. The total volume of bank loans was calculated as a 
sum of the credits in the domestic and foreign currencies: CrTot= CrATS + Cr$.  Bank loans’ 
data are available for the whole banking system as well as for separate banking groups such 
as joint-stock banks /Aktienbanken und Bankiers/, savings banks /Sparkassensektor/ , 
regional (federal) mortgage banks /Landes-Hypothekenbanken/ and banks from other 
sectors of the Austrian banking system, namely Raiffeisensektor, Volksbankensektor, 
Bausparkassen and Sonderbanken (this division by sectors reflects the ownership structure).  
Unfortunately, the dataset of credits given to different types of borrowers has not been 
updated since 1995, therefore an analysis that takes into account the heterogeneous 
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borrowers’ structure is impossible. All the variables except the interest rates were 
transformed to logarithms.  
3.2 Unit root test 
The results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for unit root are presented in Table 2, 
the null-hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected for the levels of IP, M1, M2, M3, CPI and the 
credit data, whereas it is rejected for the first differences for most of the series, except 
credits in foreign currencies. The latter type of credits experienced substantial growth in the 
last period, which is most likely connected to the formation of the European Monetary Union. 
These results are coinciding with the majority of economic and econometric theories, which 
treat macro-economic series as first-order integrated processes. Even though the 
nonstationarity of real interest rates contradicts the classical theory, the comprehension of 
nonstationary shocks into the system can introduce the stochastic trend to the interest rates, 
too. 
3.3 Cointegration analysis 
Table 3 demonstrates the results of the Johansen cointegration test for a system of seven 
variables, namely: bank loans, money supply, inflation CPI, industrial production IP and three 
interest rates: long-term I10y, short-term I3m and the National Bank reference rate IRefer. M2 
and M3 aggregates were subsequently used as the measure of money supply. The total 
volume of bank loans CrTot, bank-drafts to domestic non-banking firms CrW, mortgage loans 
and municipal notes CrHK, the total volume of credits in domestic currency CrATS and in 
foreign currencies Cr$ were consecutively employed as the measure of bank loans. The total 
volume of bank loans granted by different banking groups was applied in order to investigate 
possible discrepancies in the credit channel for different bank types. Table 3-A shows a 
summary of the Johansen cointegration test for different types of loans given by specific 
banking groups, namely joint-stock banks and regional (federal) mortgage banks. As our 
data are not seasonally adjusted, twelve lags were included. Analysis was also performed 
both with and without seasonal dummies as exogenous variables.1 The summary of five 
specifications for trend in data and trend-intercept in cointegration equations is presented.2 
                                                 
1
 Inclusion of seasonal variables={0,1} affects both the mean and the trend, Johansen suggests to use centered 
seasonal dummies, which only shift mean without contribution to the trend. To avoid the multicolliniarity problem, 
11 seasonal dummies were employed; 12th seasonal dummy together with the constant term would form exactly 
collinear set. 
2
 The investigated specifications correspond to E-Views ones: 
1. no deterministic trends in series and no intercepts in cointegrating equations, 
2. no deterministic trends in series and intercepts in the cointegrating equations, 
3. linear trends in data and intercept in cointegrating equations, 
4. linear trends in both series and cointegrating equations, 
5. quadratic trends in series and linear trend in cointegrating equations. 
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While the results for different types of credits give about the same number of cointegrating 
vectors (except for bank-drafts to domestic non-banking firms and the sub-table with the 
inclusion of seasonal dummies and M2), the employment of the total volume of credits for 
different banking groups changes the cointegration rank of a system very much. For later 
use we will fix the cointegration specification to the third assumption, which allows a linear 
trend in the original series and an intercept in the cointegrating vectors. Firstly, this choice is 
based on the postulation, that long-run equilibrium conditions between macroeconomic 
variables such as industrial production and consumption do not have trends in the majority of 
cases. Secondly, a linear trend in data (taken in logarithms) coincides with the supposition of 
economic growth, and finally, the third specification of trend-intercept demonstrates the most 
stable results for the number of cointegrating vectors among the other specifications. If we 
employ different credit types for the whole banking system or the total volume of credits as 
the loan variable, then the third specification gives five cointegrating vectors for the system 
of seven variables in most of the cases, with the exception of bank-drafts to domestic non-
banking firms CrW (where it decreases to four cointegration vectors) and the sub-table with 
the inclusion of seasonal dummies and M2 (where the common stochastic trends were not 
found for the total volume of credits and for domestic currency credits). The utilization of 
credits granted by different banking groups as the loan variable varies the result of the 
Johansen cointegration test from four cointegrating vectors (which corresponds to three 
common stochastic trends) to seven (which stands for independent non-stationary series).  
The bivariate cointegration test (Table 3-B) is carried out to control the results of the 
mutual check. The test is executed for the second and the third specification of the 
cointegration option and with and without seasonal dummies. One more time the third 
specification reveals more stable properties for our data set: if it shows the presence of 
cointegration, then the number of cointegrating vectors for the second specification is equal 
to one, too. The opposite does not hold: the second specification demonstrates cointegration 
too often, what is rejected by the third specification. Interest rate series were found to be not 
cointegrated with each other, as well as monetary aggregates. The short-term interest rate 
I3m exhibits cointegration with the industrial production IP, and the National Bank rate IRefer is 
cointegrated with CPI (for both of the investigated cointegration specifications). Credit 
variables also demonstrate the absence of bivariate cointegration, but they are cointegrated 
with some monetary aggregates, so the total volume of loans CrTot is cointegrated with M2, 
and bank-drafts to domestic non-banking firms CrW with M3. As a result we have three 
bivariate cointegrating vectors: the short-rate with IP, the National Bank rate with CPI and 
loans with monetary aggregates (CrTot with M2 and CrW with M3), what does not contradict 
the final upshot of five (or four) cointegrating vectors for the system of seven variables. 
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4. Results of the empirical analysis  
4.1 Velocity of money and loans 
On the basis of the results of the Johansen cointegration test (Table 3), VEC models were 
estimated for the system of seven variables: bank loans, money supply, inflation CPI, 
industrial production IP and three interest rates with an application of different measures of 
bank loans and money aggregates. The third specification for trend-intercept in cointegrating 
vectors was used and the number of cointegrating vectors for every measure of bank loans 
and money aggregates was taken as suggested by the Johansen test. Also, twelve lags of 
every explanatory variable were included in VECs with and without seasonal dummies as 
exogenous arguments. Cointegrating vectors identify the long-run relationships of 
endogenous variables, while error-correction terms are responsible for the convergence of 
the deviations from cointegrating equations back to equilibrium. The error-correction term 
that includes the money (or loan) variable can be considered as the velocity of money 
(loan) and is responsible for the short-run dynamics that depict the adjustment process of the 
deflection from the long-run equilibrium path. The error-correction term representing money 
velocity  (MV) has the form: 
MV M CPI IPt t CPI t IP t const= + + +- - -1 1 1a a a    for 5 cointegrating vectors in VEC; 
MV M CPI IP I refert t CPI t IP t I refer t const= + + + +- - - -1 1 1 1a a a a_ _     for 4 cointegrating vectors. 
The error-correction term representing loan velocity (LV) has the form: 
LV L CPI IPt t CPI t IP t const= + + +- - -1 1 1a a a                    for 5 cointegrating vectors in VEC; 
LV L CPI IP I refert t CPI t IP t I refer t const= + + + +- - - -1 1 1 1a a a a_ _       for 4 cointegrating vectors; 
where M is a chosen monetary aggregate and L is a loan variable. Table 4-A/4-B exhibits the 
lags coefficients for the error-correction terms, representing the money velocity and the loan 
velocity correspondently; the lag coefficient for M t -1 / Lt -1  is set to one by construction of the 
error-correction term. Velocity type variables characterize short-run divergences from 
common stochastic trends and are appropriate terms to investigate the impact of the 
monetary policy on the real economy.  
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4.2 Granger causality between velocities of money and loans and 
changes in industrial production 
To study the impact of money and loan velocities on changes in the real output, the Granger 
causality test for joint significance of regression coefficients was performed. Granger 
causality measures the information content of an explanatory variable corresponding to the 
future movement of an endogenous variable. Table 5 presents p-values of Wald statistics for 
regressions, each of which contains twelve lags of the change in the industrial production 
and a constant. At first, we check the basic regressions (those, which do not contain 
monetary or credit variables), and include the changes in CPI or spread as an explanatory 
variable. The Wald test demonstrates the significance of spread for the future real output 
behaviour and that the first difference of CPI is not significant for regressions with only one 
explanatory variable. The basic regressions, which include both lags of CPI and spread, turn 
to reject the significance of both variables for the changes in the industrial production. 
Subsequent regressions use money and credit velocities as explanatory variables as well. 
These velocity variables were calculated for 36 cases, utilizing different measures of money 
and loans, see Table 4 for coefficients for error-correction terms, representing velocities of 
money and loan. Groups 1-18 use different types of credits as the loan variable, out of which 
groups 1-10 utilize M3 as the measure of money, whereas groups 11-18 employ M2; groups 
19-36 include credits for different bank sectors, out of which groups 19-28 contain M3 
monetary aggregate and groups 29-36 M2. While odd groups do not include seasonal 
dummies as explanatory variables, even groups do contain them. For every group out these 
36, the seven following regressions, employing twelve lags of explanatory variables, twelve 
lags of the changes in the industrial production and a constant, were estimated:  
1. the loan velocity is used as an explanatory variable; 
2. the money velocity is used as an explanatory variable; 
3. the loan and the money velocities are used as explanatory variables; 
4. the loan and the money velocities and the changes in CPI are used as explanatory 
variables; 
5. the loan and the money velocities and spread are used as explanatory variables; 
6. the loan velocity and spread are used as explanatory variables; 
7. the money velocity and spread are used as explanatory variables. 
The first and the second regression examine the significance of the credit or the money 
channel alone; to study the independence of the credit (or the money) channel from the other 
monetary transmission channels, we add further explanatory variables to the regression. 
Considering the different types of credits (groups 1-18), we find that the credit channel alone 
(first regression) was important only for the first group (the total volume of credits, M3 as the 
monetary variable without seasonal dummies). This significance vanishes, if we review the 
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regression together with spread. The hypothesis of the importance of the credit channel is 
rejected, if we employ foreign currency credits Cr$ and bank-drafts to domestic non-banking 
firms CrW (groups three, four, nine, ten, seventeen and eighteen of Table 5). ATS credits 
CrATS and mortgage loans and municipal notes CrHK exhibit interesting properties: the credit 
channel is never significant alone, but becomes significant together with the money channel 
in the majority of cases. It is interesting, that, as far as domestic currency loans CrATS or 
mortgage loans and municipal notes CrHK, accompanied by M3 aggregate are concerned, 
neither the money or the credit channel alone nor taken together with spread is significant, 
but they become significant, as soon as they are added (also together with spread). Looking 
at Granger causality for the loan velocities, which were calculated for credits granted by 
different bank types, we find that the credit channel is never vital for Bausparkassen, the 
Raiffeisensektor and Sonderbanken (groups 21, 22, 25-28, 33-36), whereas it generally is 
significant alone (or together with the other explanatory variables) for joint-stock banks and 
regional (federal) mortgage banks. To study the relative importance of the credit and the 
money channel, we need to perform additional investigations. 
4.3 Impulse responses for industrial production in VECs 
As an additional step in the investigation of the relative impact of the money and the credit 
channel in the monetary policy transmission, we use impulse-response functions, which 
trace out the effect of a standard deviation shock to one variable on the behaviour of the 
other endogenous variables in VEC. Corresponding VECs were estimated at section 4.1 for 
the system of seven variables: CPI, IP, three interest rates, bank loan and money aggregate. 
From the 36 combinations of the loan-money variables (inspected in section 4.2), we use 
only those cases, in which the credit channel was found to be significant alone or together 
with the money channel, namely the groups one, five-eight, 13-16, 19-20, 23-24, 29-32. 
Impulse-response functions allow us to explore different ways to transfer a shock in the 
monetary policy variable (the National Bank rate) to the real output (Figure 1). As was 
mentioned before, the mere consideration of the impulse-response of the real economy to a 
shock in money aggregates (or loans) is not sufficient, since it might be not related to the 
monetary transmission mechanism. At first we calculate the reference impulse -response 
functions of the industrial production to innovations in the National Bank rate, which access 
at first money and loan markets before they travel to the real economy (in Figure 1 channels 
a1 and b1 operate before a2 and b2). A positive standard deviation of I
Refer in VEC affects all 
the variables in the following order: the money aggregate, loan, interest rates, CPI, IP. Then 
we consecutively close the money and the credit channel by simply changing the order in 
which a shock in the monetary policy affects the real economy. For the closed money 
channel the order in which a shock in IRefer is transmitted to IP is: loans, interest rates, CPI, 
IP, the money aggregate, whereas for the closed credit channel it is: the money aggregate, 
interest rates, CPI, IP, loans. If the impulse-response function of IP with one channel closed 
varies notably from the reference impulse-response function, then the corresponding 
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channel is important for the monetary policy transmission. Figures 2 show impulse-response 
functions of IP to a positive one-standard-deviation shock in the National Bank rate for the 
reference case (with both channels open) and for the closed money and the closed credit 
channel; Figure 3 demonstrates the effects of a shock in the National Bank rate on the 
money aggregates and loans.  
As regards groups 1-18, that contain different types of credits, we see that the credit channel 
is more pronounced than the money channel for both the investigated domestic currency 
credits CrATS (Figures 2-A and 2-C) and mortgage loans and municipal notes CrHK (Figures 2-
B and 2-D), no matter which of the money aggregates (M2 or M3) is used and whether 
seasonal dummies are present or absent. However, Figure 2_I shows that the credit channel 
was not important in the transmission of the monetary policy shock to IP for the total volume 
of loans CrTot (group one). This coincides with the results of the Granger causality test, where 
the credit channel was found to be significant alone, but not taken together with the money 
channel. If we employ credits granted by different banking groups for the loan variable, the 
outcome depends on the bank type applied. For joint-stock banks (Craktb, groups 19-20, 29-
30) the money channel is more pronounced when M3 is used as the money aggregate 
(Figure 2-E), though the utilization of M2 leads to both of the channels having about the 
same impact in the monetary policy transmission as it illustrated by Figure 2-G. Figures 2-F 
and 2-H demonstrate the dominance of the credit channel in the transmission of a National 
Bank rate shock to the real economy when regional (federal) mortgage banks loans (Crland, 
groups 23-24, 31-32) are used as the loan variable for most of the cases, except for group 
23, where both credit/ money channels exhibit about the same qualities. Figure 3 shows, that 
the direct response of the money aggregates to a shock in the National Bank rate is 
consistent with the money view in the long run in most cases. Positive innovations in IRefer, 
which are attached to the tightening of the monetary policy, cause a decline in deposits and 
therefore bring forth a decay in the monetary aggregates and a fall in credits on the asset 
side of depository institutes. Even though some of the impulse-response functions for the 
money aggregates exhibit a short-term (three months) increase, later they drop. For the total 
volume of credits (group one), however, such a reduction is not observed; this model 
probably does not capture all the properties of a system.  
4.4 Relative predictive power of money and loan variables for IP 
forecast 
The subsequent investigation of the relative performance of the money and the credit 
channel was done on the basis of out-of-sample forecasts. To study the influence of the 
different measures of money and loans (on their own or together with interest rates and CPI) 
on the real output forecasting, VEC models were applied for different groups of explanatory 
variables. The following assembly of explanatory indicators was used to generate 1296 
groups of variables to be investigated: IP; CPI; the money aggregate (M1, M2, M3); the 
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measure of loans in the form of different types of credits (CrTot, CrW, CrATS, CrHK, Cr$) and the 
total volume of credits given by different banking groups (Craktb, Crland, Crraif, Crspar, Crsond, 
Crvolks); interest rates (IRefer, I3m, I10y, Idep, rdkb, rs). In every group we include IP and a 
constant and allow the group to contain not more than one measure of loans and not more 
than one money aggregate; however, there is no limitation on the number of interest rates 
that can be included in one group. Although the common strategy for VEC modelling is 
based on the initial testing for the number of cointegrating vectors and number of lags 
included in the model, we use an approach, that allows us to avoid significant “handwork”. 
VEC models for every group of explanatory variables were estimated for the range of one up 
to (n-1) cointegrating vectors, for twelve lags in the AR process and for the second and the 
third specification of the cointegration option (see section 3.3), where n- is the number of 
variables included in the group. Engle and Yoo (1987) show, that for cointegrated systems 
both VECs and VARs in levels are appropriate specifications (although for longer forecast 
horizons VEC models are performing better). Therefore, also VARs in levels were used for 
the investigation of dependencies of the real output on money and credit aggregates. These 
VAR models were carried out with twelve lags for the same 1296 groups of explanatory 
variables. Unrestricted VARs often require an estimation of the large number of parameters 
and therefore can produce poor forecast, because they might reflect the sample-specific 
temporary relationships and carry them through the out-of-sample period. This can be 
avoided via either the elimination of some lags (but scrutinizing all the feasible combinations 
of lags requires a lot of time and computer resources and makes it impossible in practice) or 
via imposing restrictions, like an a-priori information on the parameters that are to be 
estimated (Bayesian approach). All VARs were estimated for four different specifications of 
lags:  
1) unrestricted model with a lag length of twelve for all the variables (all lags from one to 
twelve are included); 
and restricted models: 
2) lags with corresponding p-levels of t-statistics less than 50% are included;  
3) lags with corresponding p-levels of t-statistics less than 20% are included; 
4) lags with corresponding p-levels of t-statistics less than 10% are included;   
5) lags with corresponding p-levels of t-statistics less than 5% are included. 
P-levels for restricted models correspond to the estimation done for the whole available data 
set. 
Every model was estimated for the sample from 1983:12 to 1995:12; the twelve-steps-ahead 
forecast was calculated starting from 1996:01, and for every following iteration the window 
was shifted by one month. This forecasting procedure was repeated until the end of the 
whole available sample (2000:06) and the best 25 models of every type were chosen on the 
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basis of the out-of-sample forecast performance for forecast intervals of six steps ahead 
(one half of a year) and twelve steps ahead (one year prediction). Different error measures33 
were used as an out-of-sample evaluation of the model’s performance, paying attention to 
the different goodness-of-fit characteristics of the forecast, where the mean absolute error 
(MAE) corresponds to the forecast bias, the out-of-sample coefficient of determination (R2) 
constitutes the measure-of-fit of the forecast and the Theil’s coefficient measures the 
superiority of our forecast against the random walk (RW) model (where the best one-step 
prediction meets the case of non-change forecast). Two types of Theil’ coefficients were 
calculated: THIC1 uses the one-step-ahead RW prediction and THIC2 applies the two-steps-
ahead non-change forecast. For the n-steps-ahead forecast the denominator of THIC1 looks 
like ( )y yi i
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error coefficients for average n-steps-ahead forecasts, the forecast errors for the first, 
second ...nth step were added together with equal weights; at the end of the whole available 
sample the n-steps-ahead forecast horizon decreases from n and reaches one at the last 
point examined.  
The statistics for the forecast-performance of the 25 leading VEC models are presented in 
Table 6; Table 7 demonstrates the forecast-performance of the 25 leading VARs. As far as 
MAE and RMSE appear to be the most reliable measures for the analysis of the forecast-
performance, the results are ordered by minimising MAE and subsequently minimising 
RMSE. Panels A correspond to the average best prediction of twelve observations ahead 
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(one year forecast), Panels B accord to the models with the average best prediction of six 
observations ahead (half a year forecast). The forecast-performance of VEC models does 
not achieve the accuracy of the restricted VARs for both forecast horizons; VARs exhibit 
lower errors and higher values of the out-of-sample R2. The 25 leading VECs and VARs for 
the one-year-forecast horizon (Panels A) contain monetary aggregates alone (without loans) 
in 64% and 44% of the cases respectively, include both loan and money variables in 36% of 
the cases (for both VEC and VAR models) and incorporate credit variables alone in 20% of 
the cases for VARs and in no case in the leading VECs. The shortening of the forecast-
interval to six months  (Panels B) changes the results as follows: the 25 leading models 
contain monetary aggregates alone in 28% of the cases for VECs and in 16% of the cases 
for VARs, the “best” forecasting models include both money and loan indicators in 72% of 
the cases for VECs and in 56% of the cases for VARs and the leading models, that embed 
credit variables alone, form 28% of the cases for VARs and do not occur among leading 
VECs. These percentages underline the high predictive power of monetary indicators for the 
real activity for a one-year horizon and the reduction of the predictive power with the 
decrease of the forecast-interval. A six months’ timespan would rather be considered a more 
appropriate period for the monetary policy transmission than a one-year horizon, since it 
reflects the essential delay for the real sector to react on changes in the monetary policy. 
However, among the 25 leading models the simultaneous operation of both the money and 
the credit channel (specified by the inclusion of both the monetary and the loan indicators in 
the model) turns out to have a higher predictive power than the operation of a single 
channel. This empirical method doesn’t allow us to analyse the relative impact of a single 
channel during its simultaneous functioning, but it allows us to find out the importance of 
different loan variables for the credit channel operation. Among all the cases, in which loan 
variables were involved in leading models, the total volume of credits in domestic currency 
(CrATS) occurred in 36% of the cases for VECs and in 28% of the cases for VARs. The total 
volume of mortgage loans and municipal notes (CrHK) appeared in 32% of the cases for 
VECs and in 20% of the cases for VARs. The other credit variables were not as important as 
mentioned above and included only the total volume of different types of loans attracted by 
all the Austrian banks and not the loans granted by different banking groups. The 
combination of these three empirical methods emphasizes the superior role of two types of 
loans (the total volume of credits in domestic currency CrATS and the total volume of 
mortgage loans and municipal notes CrHK attracted by all the Austrian banks) in the operation 
of the credit channel. This reflects that these credits are more connected to the changes in 
the real sector growth than the other loan variables.  
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5. Concluding remarks 
The effectiveness of the monetary policy, expressed in the extent, to which changes in the 
National Bank rate are transferred into the real economy sector, as well as the relative 
impact of different channels on the monetary policy conduction are closely connected to the 
structure of the legal and the financial system of a country, the health and the concentration 
of its banking system, the availability of non-banking sources of finance and the development 
of the capital market. Theories of the transmission mechanism distinguish between the 
traditional money view and the credit channel, in which financial assets and liabilities play a 
prominent role in the transfer of monetary impulses into the real sector output. The 
imperfections of the Austrian capital market, the limited number of listed corporate securities 
and the superior position of bank credits compared to other financial resources imply the 
high sensitivity of the Austrian economy to changes in the monetary policy. The above-
mentioned arguments would also suppose a relatively strong impact of the lending channel 
in the distribution of monetary innovations to the real sector. The heterogenous structure of 
borrowers and banks could lead to divergences in the transmission of the monetary policy, 
taking into account different types of loans. The available dataset didn’t provide an 
opportunity to investigate credits given to different types of borrowers but supplied the total 
volume of loans granted by different banking groups as well as several types of loans 
attracted by all the Austrian banks. M2 and M3 monetary aggregates were employed as 
financial indicators to link the monetary policy with the real output. The result of the 
examination of the total volume of loans granted by all the Austrian banks implies, that the 
money channel is more important than the credit channel in the transmission mechanism of 
policy shocks. However, the significance of the credit channel was marked by each of the 
three employed empirical methods (incorporating different econometric issues), when we link 
the total volume of credits in domestic currency and the total volume of mortgage loans and 
municipal notes to the dynamic response of the real output to monetary policy shocks. The 
impulse-response functions of VEC models strongly suggest, that the credit channel was 
more pronounced for these types of loans, no matter which of the money variable was used. 
The results of the out-of-sample forecast of the industrial production confirm the significant 
predictive power of the total volume of ATS-credits and mortgage loans and municipal notes 
- they were the most frequently used credit variables in the leading VEC and VAR models for 
both six-months and one-year forecast horizons. Granger causality tests together with the 
impulse-response functions for VECs propose two other loan variables (namely, credits 
granted by joint-stock banks and regional (federal) mortgage banks) to play an important role 
in the credit channel functioning. But, as these credit variables never appeared in the leading 
VEC and VAR models for the out-of-sample IP forecast, we suppose that the use of the total 
volume of ATS-credits and mortgage loans and municipal notes as credit indicators captures 
the properties of the dynamic response of the real sector output to monetary shocks better.  
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It may be interesting to continue studies in two directions: At first, richer specifications of 
banking loans would provide us with an opportunity to investigate specific ways of the credit 
channel operation, for example the creation of loan buffers (as it was studied by Kakes, 
1998, for the Netherlands). The second extension may be the comparison of the credit 
channel mechanism in different countries in the European Monetary Union.   
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APPENDIX 
Table 1:  Description of Dataset 
Code for later 
use 
Name Source Code in  
Source 
Seas. 
Adjust. 
Currency/ 
Unit 
Transfor- 
mation 
Credit Data      
 CrW Bank-drafts to domestic non-banking firms/ Wechselkredite an inlandische Nichtbanken KGEN WECN"M n ATS log 
 CrHK Mortgage loans and municipal notes/ Hypothekar -, Kommunaldarlehen KGEN HYSN"M n ATS log 
 CrATS Total volume of credits in domestic currency/ Schilling-Kredite an inlandische Nichtbanken KGEN ESMN"M n ATS log 
 Cr$ Total volume of credits in foreign currencies/ Fremdwährungskredite  KGEN FRWN"M n ATS log 
 Cr1 Short-term credits with (up to 1 year) KGEN L1MN"M n ATS log 
 Cr1-5 Middle-term credits (1-5 years) KGEN L2MN"M n ATS log 
 Cr5 Long-term credits (more than 5 years) KGEN L3MN"M n ATS log 
Money Aggregates      
 CASH Banknotes in circulation KGEN FBARGN"M n ATS log 
 COIN Coins in circulation KGEN FSCHMN"M n ATS log 
 SI Sight deposits  KGEN FSIGMN"M n ATS log 
 TI Time deposits  KGEN FTEAMN"M n ATS log 
 SPI Saving deposits  KGEN FSPGMN"M n ATS log 
 M1  calculated M1=CASH-
COIN+SI 
n ATS log 
 M2  calculated M2=M1+TI n ATS log 
 M3  calculated M3=M2+SPI n ATS log 
Inflation       
 CPI Consumer price index IFS 122"64"M n index log 
Output       
 IP Industrial production IFS 122"66"M n ATS log 
Interest rates      
 IRefer Austrian National Bank interest rate/ Referenzzinsatz der Österreichischen Nationalbank  KGEN FRLOMN"M %  
 I3M 3-months rate of German National Bank/ Zinssatz für 3-Monatsgelder der Deutschen Bundesbank KGEN WREU3N"M %  
 I10y 10-years German bond's rate  IHS_prognose  %  
 Idep Austrian deposit rate IFS 122"60L"M %  
 rdkb Austrian overnight rate/ AUT Zinssatz für täglich fällige Gelder IHS_prognose  %  
 rs Austrian secondary market rate/ AUT Sekundärmarktrendite  IHS_prognose  %  
Prefixes for Credit Data for different Banks 
AKTIENBANKEN UND 
BANKIERS 
FAC VOLKSBANKENSEKTOR FGC LANDES-
HYPOTHEKENBANKEN 
FHC SONDERBANKEN FPC 
SPARKASSENSEKTOR FSC BAUSPARKASSEN FUC RAIFFEISENSEKTOR FLC INSGESAMT FC 
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Table 2:  Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of a unit root  
Level 1st Difference 
with intercept with trend with intercept with trend 
 
 
Variable 
ADF test 
statistics 
signif. ADF test 
statistics 
signif. ADF test 
statistics 
signif. ADF test 
statistics 
signif. 
IP 0.34  -1.66  -5.47 *** -5.53 *** 
M1 2.93  0.40  -2.31  -3.55 ** 
M2 1.95  0.45  -4.07 *** -4.54 *** 
M3 0.93  -1.88  -6.63 *** -6.73 *** 
CPI -0.70  -0.62  -5.68 *** -5.71 *** 
Cr$ 4.47  3.74  -0.14  -1.71  
CrW 0.13  -1.21  -3.54 *** -3.76 ** 
CrHK -2.16  0.39  -4.29 *** -4.82 *** 
CrATS -2.34  0.56  -4.09 *** -4.74 *** 
CrTot -1.18  -0.85  -5.18 *** -5.27 *** 
I3M -3.18 ** -2.65  -4.31 *** -4.67 *** 
IDEP -1.98  -1.98  -3.25 ** -3.34 * 
IREFER -1.97  -2.03  -2.91 ** -2.88  
rdisk -2.02  -2.00  -2.92 ** -2.83  
rdkb -1.38  -1.50  -3.48 ** -3.43 * 
rs -1.45  -2.00  -3.17 ** -3.16 * 
  
 
       
MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root: 
with intercept with trend 
1%   Critical Value -3.52 *** 1%   Critical Value -4.01 *** 
5%   Critical Value -2.90 ** 5%   Critical Value -3.43 ** 
10% Critical Value -2.59 * 10% Critical Value -3.14 * 
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Table 3:  Johansen cointegration test summary:  
Number of cointegrating vectors, result of LR test.  
M3 as the money variable  
Data Trend: 
None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Cointegration equations: 
No 
Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
Credit  
variable  
included 
Type of bank 
or credit No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
CrTot Total volume of credits 5 5 7 6 5 5 6 6 5 5 
Cr$ Foreign currency credits 5 5 7 6 5 5 6 6 5 5 
CrATS ATS credits 5 5 7 7 5 5 6 6 5 5 
CrHK Mortgage loans and municipal notes 5 6 7 7 5 5 6 6 5 5 
CrW Bank-drafts to domestic non-banking firms  7 7 7 7 4 4 5 5 4 5 
            
Craktb Credits granted by joint-stock banks 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 
Crbau Credits granted by Bausparkassen 5 5 6 6 5 5 6 5 4 4 
Crland Credits granted by regional mortgage banks 5 4 6 6 5 5 6 5 7 5 
Crraif Credits granted by the Raiffeisensektor 5 5 6 6 4 4 6 5 5 5 
Crspar Credits granted by savings banks 6 5 7 6 7 4 7 5 7 5 
Crvolk Credits granted by Volksbankensektor 6 6 7 7 7 7 5 5 4 4 
Crsond Credits granted by other banks 7 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 
 Seasonal dummies  + - + - + - + - + - 
 
M2 as the money variable 
Data Trend: 
None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Cointegration equations: 
No 
Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
Credit  
variable  
included 
Type of bank 
or credit No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
CrTot Total volume of credits 5 5 6 6 7 5 6 5 5 5 
Cr$ Foreign currency credits 5 4 6 6 7 5 6 5 5 5 
CrATS ATS credits 5 5 6 6 5 5 6 6 6 6 
CrHK Mortgage loans and municipal notes 5 5 7 7 5 5 6 6 6 6 
CrW Bank-drafts to domestic non-banking firms  7 5 6 6 4 4 5 4 4 4 
            
Craktb Credits granted by joint-stock banks 5 4 6 6 4 4 5 5 5 5 
Crbau Credits granted by Bausparkassen 4 4 6 6 7 7 5 5 5 4 
Crland Credits granted by regional mortgage banks 5 5 5 5 4 4 6 5 5 7 
Crraif  Credits granted by the Raiffeisensektor 5 4 6 6 4 4 5 5 4 5 
Crspar Credits granted by savings banks 5 5 6 6 7 7 5 5 5 5 
Crvolk Credits granted by Volksbankensektor 5 5 7 7 7 7 6 4 5 4 
Crsond Credits granted by other banks 5 5 5 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 Seasonal dummies  + - + - + - + - + - 
 
24 — Krylova / The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy — I H S 
 
Table 3-A:  Johansen cointegration test summary for loans of Joint-stock banks and Regional 
(federal) mortgage banks: Number of cointegrating vectors, result of LR test.  
 
M3 as the money variable 
Data Trend: 
None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Cointegration equations: 
No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
Credit  
variable  
included 
Type of bank 
or credit No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
CrATS_aktb ATS credits, Joint-stock banks 5 5 6 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 
Cr$_aktb Foreign curr.credits, Joint-stock banks 5 5 6 6 4 5 6 6 5 7 
CrHK_aktb Mortgage loans, Joint-stock banks 7 7 7 6 6 5 6 6 5 6 
CrW_aktb Bank-drafts, Joint-stock banks 5 5 6 6 5 4 6 4 7 4 
            
CrATS_land ATS credits, Regional mortgage banks 5 5 6 6 5 4 6 6 4 4 
Cr$_ land Foreign curr.credits, Regional mortgage banks 5 5 7 6 5 5 6 6 7 7 
CrHK_ land Mortgage loans, Regional mortgage banks 7 7 7 6 6 5 6 6 5 6 
CrW_ land Bank-drafts, Regional mortgage banks 5 5 6 6 4 4 6 5 4 4 
 Seasonal dummies  + - + - + - + - + - 
 
M2 as the money variables 
Data Trend: 
None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Cointegration equations: 
No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
Credit  
variable  
included 
Type of bank 
or credit No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
CrATS_aktb ATS credits, Joint-stock banks 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 
Cr$_aktb Foreign curr.credits, Joint-stock banks 5 4 6 6 7 5 6 5 5 5 
CrHK_aktb Mortgage loans, Joint-stock banks 6 6 6 6 7 7 6 6 5 5 
CrW_aktb Bank-drafts, Joint-stock banks 5 4 6 6 7 7 4 4 4 4 
            
CrATS_land ATS credits, Regional mortgage banks 5 5 6 6 5 4 6 6 4 4 
Cr$_ land Foreign curr.credits, Regional mortgage banks 5 5 6 6 5 5 6 5 7 7 
CrHK_ land Mortgage loans, Regional mortgage banks 6 6 6 6 7 7 6 6 5 5 
CrW_ land Bank-drafts, Regional mortgage banks 5 5 6 5 4 3 5 4 4 4 
 Seasonal dummies  + - + - + - + - + - 
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Table 3-B:  Bivariate Johansen cointegration test summary for the second and the third cointegration option 
Number of cointegrating vectors, result of LR test  
 IP CPI M1 M2 M3 CrTot Cr$ CrATS CrW CrHK I3m I10y  
Cointegration 
option 
b c b c b c b c b c b c b c b c b c b c b c b c 
CPI 0 0                       
M1 1 0 0 0                     
M2 0 0 2 0 0 0                   
M3 1 0 2 2 2 0 0 0                 
CrTot 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0               
Cr$ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0             
CrATS 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0           
CrW 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0         
CrHK 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0       
I3m 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     
I10y  1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
IRefer 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 4-A:  Lags Coefficients for the Error Correction Term, representing the Money Velocity 
Variables used in VEC Lag’s coefficients at corresponding terms 
Credits Money # of  
CV 
seas 
dum 
I_Refer 
(-1) 
CPI(-1) IP(-1) const 
Total volume of credits CrTot M3 5   -1.29 -0.47 -2.76 
Total volume of credits CrTot M3 5 +  -1.18 -0.45 -3.04 
Foreign currency credits Cr$ M3 5   -1.43 -0.25 -2.92 
Foreign currency credits Cr$ M3 5 +  -1.24 -0.24 -3.32 
ATS credits CrATS M3 5   18.76 -29.15 14.51 
ATS credits CrATS M3 5 +  6.20 -10.93 3.17 
Mortgage loans and municipal notes CrHK M3 5   -3.75 3.42 -5.64 
Mortgage loans and municipal notes CrHK M3 5 +  -15.19 21.90 -19.67 
Bank-drafts to domestic non-banking firms  CrW M3 4  -0.02 -1.79 -0.14 -2.33 
Bank-drafts to domestic non-banking firms  CrW M3 4 + -0.02 -1.80 -0.24 -2.10 
Total volume of credits CrTot M2 5   0.58 -1.74 -3.35 
Foreign currency credits Cr$ M2 5   0.48 -1.57 -3.49 
ATS credits CrATS M2 5   0.73 -2.21 -2.70 
ATS credits CrATS M2 5 +  0.17 -1.29 -3.44 
Mortgage loans and municipal notes CrHK M2 5   0.90 -2.56 -2.37 
Mortgage loans and municipal notes CrHK M2 5 +  0.26 -1.38 -3.43 
Bank-drafts to domestic non-banking firms  CrW M2 4  0.00 0.52 -1.79 -3.15 
Bank-drafts to domestic non-banking firms  CrW M2 4 + -0.02 0.53 -1.90 -2.81 
Credits granted by joint-stock banks Craktb M3 4  -0.01 -1.58 -0.40 -2.26 
Credits granted by joint-stock banks Craktb M3 4 + -0.02 -1.76 -0.27 -2.16 
Credits granted by Bausparkassen Crbau M3 5   -1.13 -0.29 -3.43 
Credits granted by Bausparkassen Crbau M3 5 +  -1.00 -0.57 -3.14 
Credits granted by regional mortgage banks Crland M3 5   -1.43 -0.56 -2.32 
Credits granted by regional mortgage banks Crland M3 5 +  -1.39 -0.58 -2.36 
Credits granted by the Raiffeisensektor Crraif  M3 4  -0.02 -1.96 -0.01 -2.24 
Credits granted by the Raiffeisensektor Crraif  M3 4 + -0.02 -1.99 0.00 -2.21 
Credits granted by other banks Crsond M3 4  -0.02 -1.68 -0.33 -2.17 
Credits granted by other banks Crsond M3 4 + -0.02 -1.71 -0.28 -2.21 
Credits granted by joint-stock banks Craktb M2 4  0.00 0.78 -2.04 -3.16 
Credits granted by joint-stock banks Craktb M2 4 + -0.01 0.31 -1.57 -3.10 
Credits granted by regional mortgage banks Crbau M2 4  0.04 1.36 -2.69 -3.26 
Credits granted by regional mortgage banks Crbau M2 4 + 0.02 0.89 -2.26 -3.08 
Credits granted by the Raiffeisensektor Crraif  M2 4  -0.01 0.20 -1.42 -3.22 
Credits granted by the Raiffeisensektor Crraif  M2 4 + 0.00 0.21 -1.46 -3.16 
Credits granted by other banks Crsond M2 4  -0.02 0.64 -1.89 -3.06 
Credits granted by other banks Crsond M2 4 + -0.01 0.54 -1.85 -3.00 
 
The lag coefficient for Mt-1 is set to one 
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Table 4-B:  Lags Coefficients for the Error Correction Term, representing the Loan Velocity 
Variables used in VEC Lag’s coefficients at corresponding terms 
Credits Money # of  CV 
seas 
dum 
i_refer 
(-1) CPI(-1) IP(-1) const 
Total volume of credits CrTot M3 5   -1.45 -4.44 0.28 
Total volume of credits CrTot M3 5 +  -1.64 -4.52 0.82 
Foreign currency credits Cr$ M3 5   1.02 -5.19 3.17 
Foreign currency credits Cr$ M3 5 +  0.23 -5.28 4.91 
ATS credits CrATS M3 5   42.99 -64.25 36.26 
ATS credits CrATS M3 5 +  16.48 -25.66 12.08 
Mortgage loans and municipal notes CrHK M3 5   -7.20 8.17 -8.24 
Mortgage loans and municipal notes CrHK M3 5 +  -33.82 51.19 -40.97 
Bank-drafts to domestic non-banking firms  CrW M3 4  -0.17 -9.54 9.64 -4.04 
Bank-drafts to domestic non-banking firms  CrW M3 4 + -0.18 -10.72 9.96 -2.31 
Total volume of credits CrTot M2 5   -1.20 -4.51 -0.07 
Foreign currency credits Cr$ M2 5   1.62 -5.15 1.92 
ATS credits CrATS M2 5   1.19 -5.50 2.27 
ATS credits CrATS M2 5 +  0.08 -3.86 1.21 
Mortgage loans and municipal notes CrHK M2 5   0.64 -5.56 3.49 
Mortgage loans and municipal notes CrHK M2 5 +  -0.56 -3.45 1.66 
Bank-drafts to domestic non-banking firms  CrW M2 4  -0.22 -9.27 9.87 -4.77 
Bank-drafts to domestic non-banking firms  CrW M2 4 + -0.26 -9.51 9.81 -3.89 
Credits granted by joint-stock banks Craktb M3 4  -0.01 3.36 -6.35 -4.28 
Credits granted by joint-stock banks Craktb M3 4 + -0.02 3.16 -6.22 -4.14 
Credits granted by Bausparkassen Crbau M3 5   -7.52 23.64 -38.76 
Credits granted by Bausparkassen Crbau M3 5 +  -5.66 21.12 -37.42 
Credits granted by regional mortgage banks Crland M3 5   -2.33 -7.67 10.92 
Credits granted by regional mortgage banks Crland M3 5 +  -2.37 -7.63 10.91 
Credits granted by the Raiffeisensektor Crraif  M3 4  0.10 2.47 -8.30 1.14 
Credits granted by the Raiffeisensektor Crraif  M3 4 + 0.09 2.49 -8.30 1.21 
Credits granted by other banks Crsond M3 4  -0.19 -31.39 21.80 10.82 
Credits granted by other banks Crsond M3 4 + -0.19 -32.11 22.66 10.52 
Credits granted by joint-stock banks Craktb M2 4  -0.01 3.32 -6.38 -4.16 
Credits granted by joint-stock banks Craktb M2 4 + -0.02 3.10 -6.15 -4.15 
Credits granted by regional mortgage banks Crbau M2 4  0.07 -0.67 -9.18 10.22 
Credits granted by regional mortgage banks Crbau M2 4 + 0.03 -1.82 -8.12 10.62 
Credits granted by the Raiffeisensektor Crraif  M2 4  0.13 2.48 -8.92 2.21 
Credits granted by the Raiffeisensektor Crraif  M2 4 + 0.11 2.30 -8.74 2.30 
Credits granted by other banks Crsond M2 4  -0.42 -34.47 26.46 9.04 
Credits granted by other banks Crsond M2 4 + -0.27 -33.38 24.74 9.40 
 
The lag coefficient for Lt-1 is set to one 
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Table 5:  Granger Causality Tests for Industrial Production 
P-values for F-statistics of  Wald test’s of joint significance of lag coefficients 
 coefficients at lags of corresponding variables  coefficients at lags of corresponding variables  
 LV MV d(CPI) spread adj R2  LV MV d(CPI) spread seas.dummyadj R2 
 Basic regression with spread   + seasonal dummies    
    0.02 0.91     0.04 + 0.92 
 Basic regression with CPI changes   + seasonal dummies     
   0.12  0.90    0.11  + 0.92 
 Basic regression with both variables  + seasonal dummies     
   0.43 0.12 0.91    0.17 0.08 + 0.92 
1 Total volume of credits CrTot, M3 2  + seasonal dummies     
 0.01    0.90  0.06    + 0.92 
  0.08   0.90   0.03   + 0.92 
 0.05 0.17   0.91  0.15 0.08   + 0.92 
 0.38 0.24 0.58  0.91  0.30 0.15 0.41  + 0.92 
 0.39 0.13  0.06 0.92  0.41 0.01  0.01 + 0.93 
 0.25   0.09 0.91  0.25   0.19 + 0.92 
  0.04  0.01 0.92   0.00  0.00 + 0.93 
3 Foreign currency credits Cr$ , M3 4  + seasonal dummies     
 0.15    0.90  0.06    + 0.92 
  0.08   0.90   0.03   + 0.92 
 0.28 0.17   0.91  0.15 0.08   + 0.92 
 0.49 0.25 0.50  0.91  0.28 0.11 0.39  + 0.92 
 0.67 0.02  0.01 0.92  0.41 0.01  0.06 + 0.93 
 0.32   0.06 0.91  0.19   0.14 + 0.92 
  0.01  0.00 0.92   0.00  0.00 + 0.93 
5 ATS credits CrATS, M3  6  + seasonal dummies     
 0.42    0.90  0.24    + 0.92 
  0.43   0.90   0.27   + 0.92 
 0.05 0.05   0.91  0.01 0.01   + 0.93 
 0.08 0.05 0.13  0.91  0.08 0.01 0.25  + 0.93 
 0.02 0.02  0.01 0.91  0.01 0.01  0.03 + 0.93 
 0.48   0.03 0.91  0.22   0.04 + 0.92 
  0.49  0.03 0.91   0.36  0.07 + 0.92 
7 Mortgage loans CrHK, M3  8  + seasonal dummies     
 0.50    0.90  0.29    + 0.92 
  0.23   0.90   0.24   + 0.92 
 0.05 0.02   0.91  0.01 0.01   + 0.93 
 0.05 0.04 0.15  0.91  0.03 0.01 0.17  + 0.93 
 0.09 0.03  0.01 0.92  0.01 0.01  0.04 + 0.93 
 0.21   0.01 0.91  0.19   0.03 + 0.92 
  0.07  0.01 0.91   0.13  0.02 + 0.92 
9 Bank-drafts to non-banks CrW, M3 10  + seasonal dummies     
 0.08    0.90  0.54    + 0.92 
  0.01   0.91   0.05   + 0.92 
 0.89 0.26   0.91  0.79 0.13   + 0.92 
 0.89 0.26 0.52  0.91  0.71 0.26 0.36  + 0.92 
 0.95 0.16  0.13 0.91  0.85 0.09  0.13 + 0.92 
 0.52   0.22 0.91  0.91   0.18 + 0.92 
  0.02  0.07 0.91   0.09  0.09 + 0.92 
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Table 5:  Granger Causality Tests for Industrial Production 
P-values for F-statistics of  Wald test’s of joint significance of lag coefficients 
 coefficients at lags of corresponding variables coefficients at lags of corresponding variables 
 LV MV d(CPI) spread adj R2  LV MV d(CPI) spread seas.dummy adj R2 
11 Total volume of credits CrTot, M2 12 Foreign currency credits Cr$, M2  
 0.08    0.90  0.19     0.90 
  0.01   0.91   0.01    0.91 
 0.41 0.06   0.91  0.71 0.07    0.91 
 0.69 0.13 0.67  0.91  0.86 0.14 0.57   0.91 
 0.39 0.01  0.01 0.92  0.66 0.01  0.01  0.92 
 0.21   0.06 0.91  0.27   0.04  0.91 
  0.00  0.01 0.92   0.01  0.01  0.92 
13 ATS credits CrATS, M2  14  + seasonal dummies     
 0.19    0.90  0.45    + 0.92 
  0.02   0.91   0.01   + 0.92 
 0.07 0.07   0.91  0.31 0.01   + 0.92 
 0.05 0.01 0.24  0.91  0.33 0.01 0.15  + 0.93 
 0.02 0.04  0.01 0.92  0.07 0.01  0.01 + 0.93 
 0.07   0.01 0.91  0.08   0.01 + 0.92 
  0.01  0.01 0.92  0.01   0.04 + 0.93 
15 Mortgage loans CrHK, M2  16  + seasonal dummies     
 0.11    0.90  0.21    + 0.92 
  0.03   0.91   0.01   + 0.92 
 0.01 0.00   0.92  0.06 0.00   + 0.93 
 0.02 0.01 0.60  0.92  0.19 0.00 0.32  + 0.93 
 0.00 0.00  0.04 0.93  0.14 0.02  0.01 + 0.94 
 0.02   0.00 0.91  0.01   0.00 + 0.93 
  0.02  0.01 0.91   0.01  0.04 + 0.93 
17 Bank-drafts to non-banks CrW, M2 18  + seasonal dummies     
 0.07    0.90  0.43    + 0.92 
  0.01   0.91   0.02   + 0.92 
 0.41 0.08   0.91  0.93 0.16   + 0.92 
 0.061 0.14 0.55  0.91  0.59 0.06 0.07  + 0.92 
 0.84 0.02  0.06 0.91  0.95 0.10  0.13 + 0.92 
 0.49   0.21 0.91  0.86   0.21 + 0.92 
  0.01  0.01 0.92   0.05  0.09 + 0.93 
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Table 5:  Granger Causality Tests for Industrial Production 
P-values for F-statistics of  Wald test’s of joint significance of lag coefficients 
 coefficients at lags of corresponding variables coefficients at lags of corresponding variables 
 LV MV d(CPI) spread adj R2  LV MV d(CPI) spread seas.dummy adj R2 
19 Joint-stock banks Craktb, M3 20  + seasonal dummies     
 0.01    0.91  0.01    + 0.92 
  0.01   0.91   0.03   + 0.92 
 0.05 0.03   0.91  0.04 0.11   + 0.93 
 0.05 0.21 0.42  0.91  0.05 0.26 0.37  + 0.93 
 0.02 0.03  0.02 0.92  0.03 0.09  0.06 + 0.93 
 0.02   0.02 0.91  0.02   0.07 + 0.93 
  0.02  0.05 0.91   0.06  0.08 + 0.93 
21 Bausparkassen Crbau, M3  22  + seasonal dummies     
 0.71    0.90  0.52    + 0.92 
  0.07   0.90   0.03   + 0.92 
 0.87 0.15   0.90  0.77 0.08   + 0.92 
 0.81 0.37 0.34  0.90  0.41 0.02 0.09  + 0.92 
 0.68 0.01  0.00 0.92  0.75 0.01  0.00 + 0.93 
 0.21   0.00 0.91  0.26   0.02 + 0.92 
  0.00  0.00 0.92   0.00  0.00 + 0.93 
23 Reg. mortgage banks Crland, M3 24  + seasonal dummies     
 0.00    0.92  0.00    + 0.93 
  0.14   0.90   0.04   + 0.92 
 0.00 0.04   0.92  0.00 0.12   + 0.94 
 0.00 0.27 0.27  0.92  0.00 0.04 0.17  + 0.94 
 0.00 0.01  0.02 0.93  0.00 0.01  0.04 + 0.94 
 0.00   0.13 0.92  0.00   0.18 + 0.93 
  0.06  0.01 0.91   0.01  0.01 + 0.93 
25 Raiffeisensektor Kr_raif, M3  26  + seasonal dummies     
 0.57    0.90  0.70    + 0.91 
  0.01   0.91   0.03   + 0.92 
 0.63 0.01   0.91  0.59 0.03   + 0.92 
 0.56 0.04 0.42  0.91  0.49 0.07 0.33  + 0.92 
 0.41 0.01  0.05 0.91  0.14 0.01  0.02 + 0.93 
 0.81   0.06 0.90  0.68   0.05 + 0.92 
  0.03  0.08 0.91   0.07  0.09 + 0.93 
27 Other banks Crsond, M3  28  + seasonal dummies     
 0.99    0.90  0.87    + 0.91 
  0.01   0.91   0.04   + 0.92 
 0.75 0.00   0.91  0.69 0.03   + 0.92 
 0.59 0.04 0.37  0.91  0.72 0.10 0.46  + 0.92 
 0.28 0.00  0.02 0.91  0.28 0.02  0.02 + 0.93 
 0.98   0.03 0.90  0.68   0.03 + 0.92 
  0.04  0.07 0.91   0.07  0.08 + 0.93 
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Table 5:  Granger Causality Tests for Industrial Production 
P-values for F-statistics of  Wald test’s of joint significance of lag coefficients 
 coefficients at lags of corresponding variables coefficients at lags of corresponding variables 
 LV MV d(CPI) spread adj R2  LV MV d(CPI) spread seas.dummy adj R2 
29 Joint-stock banks Craktb, M2 30  + seasonal dummies     
 0.01    0.91  0.01    + 0.92 
  0.01   0.91   0.01   + 0.92 
 0.12 0.09   0.91  0.16 0.13   + 0.93 
 0.05 0.18 0.18  0.91  0.13 0.11 0.13  + 0.93 
 0.05 0.02  0.00 0.92  0.07 0.07  0.04 + 0.93 
 0.02   0.02 0.91  0.01   0.07 + 0.93 
  0.01  0.01 0.92   0.02  0.07 + 0.93 
31 Reg. mortgage banks Crland, M2 32  + seasonal dummies     
 0.05    0.91  0.01    + 0.92 
  0.06   0.91   0.07   + 0.92 
 0.00 0.00   0.92  0.00 0.01   + 0.93 
 0.00 0.01 0.19  0.92  0.00 0.02 0.04  + 0.94 
 0.00 0.00  0.04 0.92  0.00 0.03  0.15 + 0.93 
 0.16   0.08 0.91  0.02   0.09 + 0.93 
  0.08  0.03 0.91   0.10  0.07 + 0.92 
33 Raiffeisensektor Crraif, M2  34  + seasonal dummies     
 0.40    0.90  0.60    + 0.91 
  0.00   0.91   0.01   + 0.92 
 0.90 0.04   0.91  0.88 0.03   + 0.92 
 0.86 0.06 0.38  0.91  0.91 0.02 0.19  + 0.92 
 0.98 0.02  0.03 0.91  0.82 0.00  0.07 + 0.93 
 0.77   0.09 0.91  0.75   0.09 + 0.92 
  0.00  0.01 0.92   0.01  0.06 + 0.93 
35 Other banks Crsond, M2  36  + seasonal dummies     
 0.59    0.90  0.78    + 0.91 
  0.00   0.91   0.01   + 0.92 
 0.79 0.01   0.91  0.63 0.01   + 0.92 
 0.57 0.02 0.29  0.91  0.75 0.01 0.25  + 0.92 
 0.91 0.00  0.04 0.91  0.48 0.01  0.06 + 0.93 
 0.98   0.15 0.90  0.79   0.06 + 0.92 
  0.00  0.01 0.92   0.02  0.07 + 0.93 
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Table 6:  25 Leading VEC Models for the Out-of-sample IP forecast 
Panel A. The average best prediction of twelve observations ahead  (one-year forecast horizon) 
# Group # CV Coint. option MAE ME AMAPE RMSE R
2 THIC1 THIC2 
1 IP  M1 I10y IRefer  rs 4 c 10.95 -2.14 2.65 14.31 0.928 8.24 5.10 
2 IP  M1 I10y IRefer rs 4 b 10.96 -0.63 2.66 14.32 0.927 8.25 5.11 
3 IP  M1 I10y IRefer rs 3 c 11.09 -2.18 2.69 14.52 0.925 8.49 5.26 
4 IP  M1 I10y IRefer rs 3 b 11.09 -0.85 2.69 14.48 0.926 8.45 5.23 
5 IP  M1 I10y IRefer rs 2 b 11.32 -0.75 2.74 14.76 0.922 8.82 5.46 
6 IP  M1 I10y rs  rdkb 4 b 11.38 -0.45 2.76 14.52 0.926 8.43 5.22 
7 IP  M1 I10y IRefer rs 2 c 11.39 -2.26 2.76 14.94 0.920 9.10 5.64 
8 IP  M1 I10y rs  rdkb 4 c 11.52 -0.69 2.79 14.65 0.924 8.60 5.32 
9 IP CrATS M1 I10y rs  rdkb 4 b 11.66 -2.85 2.83 15.29 0.915 9.62 5.96 
10 IP  M1 I10y rs  rdkb 2 b 11.70 -1.92 2.84 15.10 0.918 9.28 5.75 
11 IP  M1 I10y rs 3 c 11.70 0.52 2.84 14.66 0.925 8.55 5.30 
12 IP  M1 I10y rs  rdkb 2 c 11.83 -2.68 2.87 15.45 0.914 9.77 6.05 
13 IP CrATS M1 I10y rs  rdkb 3 b 11.86 -2.90 2.87 15.70 0.911 10.13 6.27 
14 IP CPI CrHK M3 I10y rs  rdkb 2 c 11.91 3.38 2.89 15.67 0.912 9.97 6.18 
15 IP  M1 I3m I10y rs 3 c 11.91 -3.10 2.89 15.55 0.913 9.95 6.16 
16 IP CrATS M1 I10y rs  rdkb 3 c 12.00 -3.70 2.91 15.87 0.909 10.38 6.43 
17 IP CrATS M1 I10y rs  rdkb 5 c 12.02 -5.46 2.91 15.70 0.910 10.18 6.30 
18 IP CPI CrATS M3 I10y rs  rdkb 2 c 12.04 -2.44 2.93 15.57 0.915 9.69 6.00 
19 IP  M2 I10y rs 3 b 12.08 1.86 2.91 15.46 0.923 8.70 5.39 
20 IP  M2 I10y rs 3 c 12.10 1.97 2.91 15.47 0.924 8.69 5.38 
21 IP CrATS M1 I10y IRefer rs 3 c 12.13 -3.50 2.94 15.67 0.912 10.02 6.20 
22 IP CrHK M1 I10y rs  rdkb 4 b 12.14 -2.62 2.94 15.91 0.909 10.31 6.39 
23 IP  M1 I10y rs  rdkb 3 b 12.16 -3.42 2.95 15.47 0.915 9.68 5.99 
24 IP  M1 I3m I10y rs 4 b 12.20 -3.80 2.96 15.81 0.910 10.25 6.35 
25 IP CrHK M3 I10y rs 3 b 12.21 -1.01 2.96 15.23 0.916 9.52 5.90 
 
Panel B. The average best prediction of six observations ahead  (half a year forecast horizon) 
# Group # CV Coint. option MAE ME AMAPE RMSE R
2 THIC1 THIC2 
1 IP CPI CrHK M3 I10y rs  rdkb 2 c 1.21 0.27 2.95 1.65 0.908 10.88 6.73 
2 IP CrHK M3 I10y IRefer rs 1 c 1.22 -0.30 2.97 1.58 0.915 10.06 6.22 
3 IP CPI CrHK M3 I10y rs  rdkb 3 c 1.22 0.30 2.98 1.67 0.905 11.28 6.97 
4 IP  M2 I3m rs 1 c 1.23 -0.11 3.00 1.51 0.923 9.13 5.64 
5 IP CPI CrHK M3 I10y rs  rdkb 4 c 1.23 0.30 3.01 1.70 0.901 11.71 7.24 
6 IP CrATS M1 I10y rs  rdkb 4 b 1.25 -0.12 3.04 1.61 0.911 10.52 6.50 
7 IP CrATS M1 I10y rs  rdkb 3 c 1.25 -0.20 3.04 1.63 0.909 10.81 6.68 
8 IP CrATS M1 I10y IRefer rs 3 c 1.25 -0.23 3.05 1.61 0.912 10.41 6.44 
9 IP CrATS M1 I10y rs  rdkb 5 c 1.25 -0.39 3.05 1.63 0.910 10.72 6.62 
10 IP CrATS M3 I10y rs 3 b 1.25 -0.15 3.05 1.60 0.914 10.22 6.32 
11 IP CPI CrHK M3 I10y rs  rdkb 5 c 1.26 0.33 3.06 1.74 0.896 12.27 7.58 
12 IP CPI CrHK M3 I10y rs  rdkb 6 c 1.26 0.37 3.06 1.74 0.896 12.28 7.59 
13 IP  M1 I10y IRefer rs 4 b 1.26 -0.12 3.07 1.62 0.911 10.55 6.52 
14 IP  M1 I10y IRefer rs 4 c 1.26 -0.22 3.07 1.61 0.912 10.42 6.44 
15 IP CPI CrATS M3 I10y rs  rdkb 4 c 1.26 0.19 3.07 1.73 0.899 11.98 7.41 
16 IP CrHK M3 I10y rs 1 c 1.26 0.12 3.07 1.62 0.911 10.58 6.54 
17 IP CPI CrATS M3 I10y rs  rdkb 3 c 1.26 0.07 3.08 1.70 0.902 11.57 7.15 
18 IP CrATS M1 I10y rs  rdkb 3 b 1.27 -0.14 3.09 1.65 0.907 11.05 6.83 
19 IP  M1 I10y IRefer rs 3 c 1.27 -0.22 3.09 1.63 0.910 10.66 6.59 
20 IP CrHK M3 I10y rs 3 b 1.27 -0.03 3.08 1.61 0.911 10.48 6.48 
21 IP CrTot M1 I3m 3 c 1.27 0.24 3.09 1.67 0.908 10.93 6.75 
22 IP  M1 I10y IRefer rs 3 b 1.27 -0.12 3.09 1.64 0.909 10.74 6.63 
23 IP  M2 I3m rs 2 b 1.27 -0.03 3.09 1.59 0.917 9.82 6.07 
24 IP  M2 I3m rs 3 c 1.27 0.20 3.09 1.64 0.912 10.42 6.44 
25 IP CPI CrATS M3 I10y rs  rdkb 2 c 1.27 -0.16 3.11 1.68 0.904 11.35 7.01 
All of VEC models include twelve lags 
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Table 7:  25 Leading VAR Models for the Out-of-sample IP forecast 
Panel A. The average best prediction of twelve observations ahead  (one year forecast horizon) 
# Group lags MAE ME AMAPE RMSE R2 THIC1 THIC2 
1 IP CPI CrATS I3m I10y IRefer rs   ** 0.955 -0.14 0.231 1.24 0.946 6.09 3.77 
2 IP CPI CrATS I3m I10y rs ** 0.969 -0.10 0.235 1.26 0.944 6.35 3.93 
3 IP  M1 I10y IRefer rs * 0.998 -0.15 0.242 1.35 0.936 7.32 4.54 
4 IP  M1 I3m I10y rs * 1.006 -0.15 0.244 1.36 0.934 7.49 4.64 
5 IP CrATS M1 I10y IRefer rs * 1.015 -0.11 0.246 1.30 0.940 6.82 4.22 
6 IP  M1 I10y rs * 1.030 -0.18 0.250 1.35 0.936 7.26 4.50 
7 IP CrHK M1 I10y IRefer rs * 1.034 -0.05 0.250 1.33 0.939 6.97 4.32 
8 IP  M1 I10y rs  rdkb * 1.036 -0.01 0.251 1.33 0.937 7.15 4.43 
9 IP  M2 I10y rs * 1.050 0.06 0.254 1.33 0.940 6.81 4.22 
10 IP Cr$ M1 I10y IRefer rs * 1.064 0.18 0.258 1.43 0.930 7.96 4.93 
11 IP CPI CrATS I10y IRefer rs * 1.064 0.19 0.258 1.32 0.941 6.75 4.18 
12 IP CPI CrHK I3m I10y IRefer rs   ** 1.066 -0.04 0.258 1.37 0.938 7.04 4.36 
13 IP  M1 I3m I10y IRefer rs   * 1.070 -0.19 0.260 1.46 0.925 8.55 5.30 
14 IP CrTot M1 I3m IRefer rdkb + 1.070 -0.18 0.260 1.37 0.934 7.51 4.65 
15 IP CPI CrHK M1 I3m I10y IRefer rs   ** 1.072 -0.35 0.260 1.38 0.933 7.60 4.71 
16 IP  M2 I3m I10y rs * 1.074 -0.04 0.261 1.41 0.930 7.94 4.92 
17 IP CrTot M1 I3m * 1.075 0.16 0.261 1.44 0.929 8.08 5.01 
18 IP CPI CrHK I3m I10y IRefer rs   *** 1.075 0.27 0.261 1.38 0.935 7.35 4.55 
19 IP  M1 I3m I10y IRefer rs  rdkb          * 1.079 -0.24 0.262 1.43 0.928 8.21 5.09 
20 IP CrTot M1 IRefer rs ** 1.081 0.11 0.262 1.39 0.932 7.75 4.80 
21 IP CPI M3 I10y IRefer rs  rdkb        *** 1.082 0.28 0.261 1.35 0.936 7.28 4.51 
22 IP CrTot M1 I3m IRefer rs ** 1.084 0.12 0.264 1.45 0.925 8.53 5.29 
23 IP CrTot M1 I3m rs ** 1.084 0.22 0.263 1.46 0.924 8.59 5.32 
24 IP CPI M2 I3m I10y IRefer rs   ** 1.085 0.05 0.262 1.38 0.937 7.19 4.45 
25 IP  M1 I10y IRefer rs  rdkb        * 1.086 -0.18 0.263 1.41 0.931 7.80 4.83 
Panel B. The average best prediction of six observations ahead  (half a year forecast horizon) 
# Group lags MAE ME AMAPE RMSE R2 THIC1 THIC2 
1 IP CPI CrATS I3m I10y IRefer rs   ** 0.937 0.04 0.228 1.24 0.948 6.16 3.81 
2 IP CPI CrATS I3m I10y rs ** 0.946 0.05 0.230 1.25 0.947 6.23 3.85 
3 IP CrTot M2 rs rdkb *** 0.989 0.12 0.240 1.28 0.945 6.55 4.05 
4 IP CrTot M2 IRefer rs  rdkb *** 0.997 0.09 0.242 1.28 0.945 6.47 4.00 
5 IP CrTot M2 IRefer rs  rdkb ** 1.018 0.02 0.248 1.32 0.942 6.89 4.26 
6 IP CPI M2 IRefer rs  rdkb *** 1.033 0.14 0.251 1.33 0.940 7.14 4.41 
7 IP CrTot M2 rs rdkb ** 1.054 0.02 0.256 1.34 0.940 7.07 4.37 
8 IP CPI CrHK I3m I10y IRefer rs   ** 1.057 0.09 0.257 1.38 0.938 7.33 4.53 
9 IP CrTot M1 IRefer rs ** 1.057 0.10 0.258 1.40 0.934 7.81 4.83 
10 IP CPI CrHK M1 I3m I10y IRefer rs   ** 1.058 -0.22 0.257 1.39 0.935 7.73 4.78 
11 IP CPI CrHK I3m I10y rs ** 1.060 -0.29 0.258 1.38 0.935 7.69 4.75 
12 IP CPI CrTot M2 IRefer rs  rdkb *** 1.064 0.29 0.258 1.41 0.934 7.85 4.85 
13 IP CPI CrATS I10y IRefer rs * 1.071 0.06 0.260 1.33 0.941 6.97 4.31 
14 IP CPI M3 I10y IRefer rs  rdkb        *** 1.073 0.28 0.260 1.36 0.939 7.27 4.49 
15 IP CrATS M1 I10y IRefer rs * 1.073 -0.15 0.262 1.37 0.936 7.56 4.67 
16 IP CrATS M1 I3m rs  rdkb ** 1.075 -0.31 0.263 1.45 0.929 8.45 5.22 
17 IP CPI CrHK  I3m I10y IRefer rs   *** 1.077 0.31 0.262 1.41 0.933 7.90 4.88 
18 IP  M2 IRefer rs  rdkb ** 1.082 0.14 0.263 1.36 0.938 7.36 4.55 
19 IP CrW M3 I10y IRefer rs * 1.083 0.13 0.263 1.38 0.935 7.64 4.72 
20 IP CrATS M1 I3m IRefer rs ** 1.087 -0.29 0.266 1.48 0.925 8.87 5.48 
21 IP CrTot M1 I3m IRefer rdkb ** 1.087 0.21 0.265 1.47 0.927 8.62 5.33 
22 IP  M1 rs ** 1.089 0.17 0.265 1.46 0.929 8.44 5.22 
23 IP CPI CrATS IRefer rs *** 1.094 0.66 0.266 1.48 0.926 8.78 5.42 
24 IP CPI Cr$ M2 IRefer rs  rdkb *** 1.094 0.32 0.265 1.43 0.931 8.19 5.06 
25 IP CrHK M1 rs rdkb ** 1.098 0.33 0.268 1.46 0.928 8.57 5.29 
 
One star in the lag specification corresponds to 50% p-level for the restricted VAR model, two stars - 
to 20% p-level, and three stars - to 10% p-level and a plus sign – to 5% p-level. 
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Monetary Policy Transmission 
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Figure 2-A 
Response of IP to a positive innovation in government rate 
Credits in domestic currency are used as the loan variable and M3 is used as the money variable 
 
 
Figure compares the reference impulse-response function of the industrial production in VEC to an 
innovation in the monetary policy variable (which firstly accesses the money and the loan markets and 
secondly the real output) with the impulse responses with the closed money / credit channel (where a 
shock is firstly entry the real sector and secondly the money / credit market)  
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Figure 2-B 
Response of IP to a positive innovation in government rate 
Mortgage loans and municipal notes are used as the loan variable and M3 is used as the money variable 
 
 
Figure compares the reference impulse-response function of the industrial production in VEC to an 
innovation in the monetary policy variable (which firstly accesses the money and the loan markets and 
secondly the real output) with the impulse responses with the closed money / credit channel (where a 
shock is firstly entry the real sector and secondly the money / credit market)  
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Figure 2-C 
Response of IP to a positive innovation in government rate 
Credits in domestic currency are used as the loan variable and M2 is used as the money variable 
 
 
Figure compares the reference impulse-response function of the industrial production in VEC to an 
innovation in the monetary policy variable (which firstly accesses the money and the loan markets and 
secondly the real output) with the impulse responses with the closed money / credit channel (where a 
shock is firstly entry the real sector and secondly the money / credit market)  
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Figure 2-D 
Response of IP to a positive innovation in government rate 
Mortgage loans and municipal notes are used as the loan variable and M2 is used as the money variable 
 
 
Figure compares the reference impulse-response function of the industrial production in VEC to an 
innovation in the monetary policy variable (which firstly accesses the money and the loan markets and 
secondly the real output) with the impulse responses with the closed money / credit channel (where a 
shock is firstly entry the real sector and secondly the money / credit market)  
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Figure 2-E 
Response of IP to a positive innovation in government rate 
Credits granted by joint-stock banks are used as the loan variable and M3 is used as the money variable 
 
 
Figure compares the reference impulse-response function of the industrial production in VEC to an 
innovation in the monetary policy variable (which firstly accesses the money and the loan markets and 
secondly the real output) with the impulse responses with the closed money / credit channel (where a 
shock is firstly entry the real sector and secondly the money / credit market)  
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Figure 2-F 
Response of IP to a positive innovation in government rate 
Regional mortgage banks loans are used as the loan variable and M3 is used as the money variable 
 
 
Figure compares the reference impulse-response function of the industrial production in VEC to an 
innovation in the monetary policy variable (which firstly accesses the money and the loan markets and 
secondly the real output) with the impulse responses with the closed money / credit channel (where a 
shock is firstly entry the real sector and secondly the money / credit market)  
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Figure 2-G 
Response of IP to a positive innovation in government rate 
Credits granted by joint-stock banks are used as the loan variable and M2 is used as the money variable 
 
 
Figure compares the reference impulse-response function of the industrial production in VEC to an 
innovation in the monetary policy variable (which firstly accesses the money and the loan markets and 
secondly the real output) with the impulse responses with the closed money / credit channel (where a 
shock is firstly entry the real sector and secondly the money / credit market)  
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Figure 2-H 
Response of IP to a positive innovation in government rate 
Regional mortgage banks loans are used as the loan variable and M2 is used as the money variable 
 
 
Figure compares the reference impulse-response function of the industrial production in VEC to an 
innovation in the monetary policy variable (which firstly accesses the money and the loan markets and 
secondly the real output) with the impulse responses with the closed money / credit channel (where a 
shock is firstly entry the real sector and secondly the money / credit market)  
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Figure 2-I 
Response of IP to a positive innovation in government rate 
Total volume of credits is used as the loan variable and M3 is used as the money variable 
 
Figure compares the reference impulse-response function of the industrial production in VEC to an 
innovation in the monetary policy variable (which firstly accesses the money and the loan markets and 
secondly the real output) with the impulse responses with the closed money / credit channel (where a 
shock is firstly entry the real sector and secondly the money / credit market)  
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Figure 3 
Response of the money to a positive innovation in government rate 
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